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Over the last few years, colonialism, especially as pursued by Europeans, has enjoyed a revival in
interest among both scholars and the general public. Although a number of new accounts cast
colonial empires in a more favorable light than has generally been customary, others contend that
colonial powers often leveraged their imbalance in power to impose institutional arrangements on
the colonies that were adverse to long-term development. We argue here, however, that one of the
most fundamental impacts of European colonization may have been in altering the composition of
the populations in the areas colonized. The efforts of the Europeans often involved implanting
ongoing communities who were greatly advantaged over natives in terms of human capital and legal
status. Because the paths of institutional development were sensitive to the incidence of extreme
inequality which resulted, their activity had long lingering effects. More study is needed to identify
all of the mechanisms at work, but the evidence from the colonies in the Americas suggests that it
was those that began with extreme inequality and population heterogeneity that came to exhibit
persistence over time in evolving institutions that restricted access to economic opportunities and
generated lower rates of public investment in schools and other infrastructure considered conducive
to growth. These patterns may help to explain why a great many societies with legacies as colonies
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sokoloff@ucla.edu  The study, if not the practice, of colonialism is again in fashion.  Over the last few years, the 
institution, especially as pursued by Europeans, has enjoyed a revival in interest among both scholars 
and the general public.  One reason for this reexamination may be sentimentality for a simpler ordered 
world, as a number of these new accounts cast colonial empires in a more favorable light than has 
generally been customary.  Deepak Lal, for example, argues that those nations that established empires 
merit praise, as their creations normally brought about lower levels of conflict and costs of carrying out 
long-distance trade, as well as promoted greater prosperity in the affected societies.
1  Niall Ferguson 
highlights progressive sides to Britain’s oversight of her colonies, such as the introduction of efficient 
civil services and rule of law, as well as the abolition of slavery. 
2  The image of kinder and gentler 
imperial powers also has some foundation in the work of Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, who in 
their meticulous and detailed estimates found that Britain was not nearly so aggressive or successful in 
extracting returns from its colonies as she could have been, and indeed that her Empire generated little in 
the way of returns for the home country overall.
3    
Quite a different motivation, however, has been behind the recent proliferation of studies by 
economists of the European effort to colonize most of the rest of the world.
4  Inspired by the goal of 
improving understanding of the processes and institutions of economic growth, these scholars have been 
attracted by the quasi-natural experiment generated by a small number of European countries 
establishing many colonies across a wide range of environments.  The logic is that the historical record 
of these different societies can be analyzed to determine whether there were systematic patterns in how 
their institutions or economies evolved with respect to initial conditions.  For example, have colonies 
with a British heritage, or those in a particular sort of physical environment, realized more economic 
progress over time than their counterparts have?  In other words, the history of European colonization 
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provides scholars with a rich supply of evidence, or a laboratory, that can be used to study economic 
performance and the evolution of institutions over the long run.  Because some of the characteristics of 
the colonies were in place at or near the time of settlement, and thus can reasonably be treated as 
exogenous, many economists have been hopeful that the data generated by their later development can 
be used to get at causal relationships or mechanisms.   
Inequality is one of the key variables that emerge from these studies as of great consequence to 
long-run paths of development.  Moreover, not only does extreme inequality seem to have had a 
profound influence on societies so afflicted, but the dynamics of European settlement meant that it 
generated many colonies in that condition.  Several research teams have arrived at similar conclusions, 
but perhaps the most direct examination of the impact of inequality has been the work we have done on 
the economies of the Americas.   Our investigation began with a question.  Why was it that for at least 
two hundred and fifty years after the Europeans arrived to colonize the so-called New World, most 
observers regarded the English, French, Dutch, and Spanish settlements on the northern part of the North 
American continent as relative backwaters with limited economic prospects, and that the flows of 
resources to the Americas mirrored that view?   The simple answer is that per capita incomes, especially 
for those of European descent, were higher in at least parts of the Caribbean and South America than 
they were in the colonies that were to become the United States and Canada well into the late-18
th and 
early 19
th centuries. Looking back from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, however, it is 
clear that the real puzzle is why the colonies that were the choices of the first Europeans to settle in the 
Americas, were those that fell behind -- and conversely, why the societies populated by those who came 
later and had to settle for areas considered less favorable have proved more successful economically 
over the long run. 
  A traditional and popular explanation for these intriguing patterns credits the success of the 
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North American economies to the superiority of English institutional heritage, or to the better fit of 
Protestant beliefs with market institutions.
5  However, proponents of this interpretation generally neglect 
the implications of the fact that various British colonies in the New World evolved quite distinct 
societies and sets of economic institutions, despite beginning with roughly the same legal and cultural 
background and drawing immigrants from similar places and economic classes. British Guiana (now 
Guyana), Jamaica, and British Honduras (now Belize) are among the many whose records of 
development stand in stark contrast with those of the United States and Canada, but resemble those of 
neighboring societies of different national heritages.  Impressed with how the evidence seemed 
inconsistent with the notions that British heritage or Protestantism was the key factor, we instead offered 
an alternative explanation of the divergent paths of development among the societies of the Americas.  
We highlighted how the great majority of European colonies in the New World came to be characterized 
early in their histories, primarily because of their factor endowments, by extreme inequality in the 
distributions of wealth, human capital, and political influence.  We argued, moreover, that these initial 
differences in inequality were of major import, because societies that began with great inequality tended, 
as compared to the small number -- including those that came to make up the U.S. and Canada -- that 
began with relative equality and homogeneity of the population, to evolve institutions that contributed to 
the persistence of substantial inequality and generally poor records of development over the long run.
6    
  What led to such substantial differences in inequality across colonies?  Briefly put, extreme 
inequality arose in the colonies of the Caribbean and in Brazil, because their soils and climates gave 
them a comparative advantage in growing sugar and other lucrative crops that were produced at lowest 
cost during the 17
th, 18
th, and 19
th centuries on very large slave plantations.  These colonies soon 
specialized heavily in their comparative advantage, and with the consequent importation of enormous 
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numbers of slaves, their populations came to be composed of a small elite of European descent with the 
dominant share of the population (generally 85 percent or more) consisting of black slaves, or (later) 
non-white freedmen and their descendants.  Extreme inequality in wealth and human capital came to 
characterize much of Spanish America as well.  The inequality arose here from the endowment of large 
populations of Native Americans surviving the initial impact with the diseases the Europeans brought 
with them, and from the Spanish practices (which were influenced by pre-existing Native-American 
organizations in Mexico and Peru) of awarding claims on land, native labor, and rich mineral resources 
to members of the elite (whose number were limited by restrictive immigration policies).  A few areas 
that had relatively small native populations, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, were less 
affected however.   In contrast, the societies of the northern part of North America developed with 
relative equality and population homogeneity, as there were relatively few Native Americans on the east 
coast where the colonies were established, and the climates and soils favored a regime of mixed farming 
centered on grains and livestock which exhibited quite limited economies of scale in production.            
  Although the great diversity of settlement patterns and economic structures across the  
 Americas provide a particularly well suited context for the study of the impact of inequality on 
institutional and economic development, the patterns in that part of the world may well have important 
implications for the experience of societies established as European colonies elsewhere. With the 
exceptions of Australia and New Zealand, European settlements in other parts of the world were not 
based upon large numbers of European settlers who became the key productive laborers, but upon small 
numbers who remained on the perimeter of the country and exercised control through military power or 
political arrangements with the local rulers. For example, the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French 
sailed around the Cape of Good Hope at roughly the same time as they went to the Americas, to acquire 
territories and control of large native populations in Asia. The numbers of European settlers were few 
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and they were generally involved in either political administration or in operating very large agricultural 
units.  As in the Caribbean, these settler populations were rarely directly employed in producing 
commodities for sale in European markets, and their primary concern was more with control than with 
the production of economic surpluses.  As for Africa, the early European settlements on the coast, 
mainly trading forts, were not able to exercise control over the native population.  Even when Europeans 
were able to move inland during the 19
th century, after the introduction of quinine, European domination 
was achieved with relatively few settlers through arrangements with local powers or via military 
prowess.
7  The last to be settled of the European colonies were the Pacific Ocean islands, including Fiji 
and Hawaii. There too, and particularly where sugar could be grown, Europeans accounted for only 
small proportions of the population.  In virtually all of these colonies, suffrage was restricted and 
expenditures on education and other public services tended to be miniscule, reflecting (and contributing 
to) the magnitude of the inequality that existed between those of European descent and others. 
  Almost everywhere Europeans settled during their grand epoch of expansion across the globe, 
they did so with far higher levels of wealth, human capital (including literacy and familiarity with 
technology and markets), and political influence or power than most of the residents native to the area 
enjoyed. Thus, where the Europeans encountered large native populations who survived contact with 
western diseases but were colonized, as in Mexico, Peru, Indonesia, or India, their advantages in human 
capital and other assets generally meant that Europeans did extremely well relative to the bulk of the 
natives, and that there was great inequality.  Where they moved into fairly empty or depopulated 
territories, however (as in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, or the United States), relative equality 
tended to prevail. 
8  The more heavily populated colonies, or those in tropical areas that could quickly 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
highest level of inequality in the world.  See Deininger and Squire 1996. 
7 The main exception to this generalization is South Africa, but even here those of European descent accounted for about 20 
percent of the population. 
8 In those cases where the endowments were well suited to large-scale labor-intensive production of staples, slaves or contract 
labor were often brought in to provide a labor force.  The importation of slaves to the Caribbean basin to grow sugar is the 
outstanding example of this, but the extensive use of contract labor from South Asia to augment the labor force, especially      
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increase population by drawing on imported slave labor, often had quite different comparative 
advantages than Europe (due to different climates, valuable natural resources, and large native 
populations).   As free populations were primarily motivated by the prospects of economic returns, these 
areas generally attracted the greater number of Europeans until the 18th century, when the greater 
opportunities associated with commercial grain agriculture and industrialization shifted attention to 
mainland North America.
9   Overall, the phenomenon of European colonization generating many 
societies with extremely high degrees of inequality, and rather few with low inequality, seems unlikely 
to have been confined to the Americas.   
 
              II 
  The stark contrasts in the degree of initial inequality across the European colonies in the 
Americas, if not elsewhere, present scholars with a wonderful opportunity to study whether and how 
inequality affects the processes and path of development.  Whereas previous treatments of the impact of 
inequality on growth have often been concerned with how savings or investment rates might be affected, 
we and other scholars who have sought to use the natural experiment provided by colonization focus on 
the hypothesis that extreme differences across colonies in the extent of inequality gave rise to systematic 
differences in the ways institutions evolved, and in turn on paths of development.
10 The argument is that 
greater equality or homogeneity among the population led, over time, to more democratic political 
institutions, more investment in public goods and infrastructure, and to institutions that offered relatively 
broad access to property rights and economic opportunities.
11 In contrast, where there was extreme 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
where land was relatively abundant, after the emancipation of slaves provides another.  See Engerman 1982, 1983, and 1986.   
9 Engerman and Sokoloff 2002. 
10 For examples of the approach that highlight variation in savings rates with relative income or with rates of taxation, see 
Alesina and Rodrik 1994 and Persson and Tabellini 19994.  For those investigating the impact of inequality on institutions 
more broadly, see Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997 and 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001 and 2002; and Easterly 
and Levine 2003. 
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inequality, political institutions were less democratic, investments in public goods and infrastructure 
were far more limited, and the institutions that evolved tended to provide highly unbalanced (favoring 
elites) access to property rights and economic opportunities.  The resulting differences in access to 
opportunities may be important in accounting for the disparate records at long-term growth, because 
where processes of early industrialization have been sustained (such as in Britain and the United States 
during the 19
th century, and even East Asia in the 20
th), they have generally involved broad participation 
in the commercial economy.  Economies that only provided narrow access to opportunities might have 
been, and be, less capable of realizing sustained economic growth.    
  There are a variety of mechanisms through which the extent of inequality in a society might 
affect the character of institutions that develop.  The avenue that typically receives the most attention 
works through political inequality.  When political power or influence is concentrated among a small 
segment of the population, that group is able to shape policies or institutions to its advantage.  We 
expect members of such elites to act in their interest, for example, by inducing the government to make 
investments and provide services they favor while being assessed for a less than proportionate share of 
the costs, or to define and enforce property and other sorts of rights in ways that treat them in a 
preferential manner.  Some activity of this sort is present in all societies, as the distribution of political 
influence is never entirely equal, and those with more resources generally fare better in the competition 
over influencing the government.  But the extent and ultimate impact of such activity can vary even 
across nominal democracies, especially when the right to vote depends on literacy or wealth (or other 
attributes), or where ballots are not secret.  The absence of democracy, or a situation when one class of 
the population has the capability to impose its will by force if need be, is an extreme case of how 
political inequality can lead to institutions that favor a narrow range of the population.   
  The importance of political inequality (or military might) often figures prominently in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1947.      
       
   
8 
 
discussions of how institutions are established in colonies.  The presumption that those with a monopoly 
of force or a dominant share of the votes get their way does not seem an unreasonable presumption.  
Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting on the relevance of the well accepted modern adage: you can’t 
always get what you want.
12  No matter how much inequality there is in political influence or in any 
other dimension, there are frequently constraints that inconveniently narrow the range of feasible 
possibilities for the fortunate individual or class.   The initial objects of the colonies established in the 
Americas, and indeed elsewhere in the world, were generally the same -- to generate economic returns 
for the respective European country.  Although the goals may have been similar, the diverse 
environments in which the colonies were located led to a variety of economic structures and institutions 
as the colonizers sought to take best advantage of the different opportunities and challenges they faced 
in the respective places.   Miscalculations of the effects of various institutional designs, with resulting 
unintended consequences, were, of course, not uncommon.  The colonists came with similar 
backgrounds and institutional heritages, but heterogeneity developed as they applied and adapted the 
technologies and institutional heritages they brought with them to conditions quite unlike those in the 
Old World.  Moreover, the extent to which the metropolis, or any political authority, could effectively 
specify the institutions prevailing in any colony varied with the local circumstances.   
  It is well known that in many of the Spanish colonies in Latin America, especially where 
aboriginal populations were concentrated, a relatively small number of individuals were favored with 
large grants of land and claims on labor and tribute from natives that long endured.  Less fully 
appreciated, however, is that there were also efforts to implant a European-style organization of 
agriculture based on concentrated ownership of land combined with labor provided by tenant farmers or 
indentured servants in many of the colonies of North America, as when Pennsylvania, New York, 
Maryland, and Canada (the same could be said for Australia) were established.  But these attempts 
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invariably failed; large landholdings unraveled because even men of ordinary means were able to set up 
and flourish as independent farmers where land was abundant and cheap, labor was scarce, and scale 
economies were absent.  Despite William Penn having received the royal charter for Pennsylvania, and 
accordingly having initial control of the territory, such conditions frustrated the attempts of this 
fabulously wealthy member of the elite to replicate an English-style organization of agriculture in the 
New World.  As much as wealthy men such as Penn might have liked in an ideal world to institute 
hierarchical institutions that greatly advantaged those of their class, their ability to attain that goal was 
tempered by the need to attract more labor and more productive labor to their respective colonies; that is, 
even landowners were desirous of taking steps that would attract more migrants from Europe and 
elsewhere.  Similarly, the Puritans who settled in the Massachusetts Bay Colony might have liked to do 
as their brethren who chose to site their early 17
th century colony on Providence Island (an island off the 
coast of Nicaragua), and rely on Native American, indentured servants, or slaves to perform their 
manual labor, but the cold harsh climate in New England would not support such a commercial 
strategy.
13  Indeed, a century later New Englanders despaired at being able to afford the high prices 
slaves commanded in the international market.
14    
  These cases suggest that political inequality alone was not sufficient for elites to obtain 
institutions that greatly advantaged them with respect to government policies or access to property rights 
and other kinds of economic opportunities.   In some environments, even when political or military 
power was highly concentrated in their hands, elites might have voluntarily, and without threat of 
violent upheaval, found it in their interest to provide better conditions and treatment to the humble.   
Although there are a variety of factors that might lead to such an evidently anomalous outcome, and 
ways of characterizing them, the relative scarcity of labor seems in the context of the European colonies 
                                                 
13 Kupperman 1993. 
14 As McManus 1973 (p. 23) makes clear, those in the northern U.S. were priced out of the market for slaves by the 1760s: 
“By 1764 Thomas Rich, one of Philadelphia’s leading traders noted that ‘the time is over for the sale of Negroes here.’”        
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to be a crucial one.  Where labor was relatively scarce, as compared to land and other resources, political 
inequality was not accompanied by economic inequality.  In such circumstances, the lack of economic 
inequality (or relative equality) circumscribed how far political elites could go in designing institutions 
to advantage their members.  In a situation where there was relative political equality, however, 
economic inequality -- as reflected in the relative scarcity of factor in somewhat elastic supply – might 
lead to institutions that greatly advantaged that scarce factor.  Hence, economic inequality can 
sometimes, in the sorts of conditions that are not uncommon in colonies or less-developed countries 
(with an abundance of unskilled labor but a scarcity of capital and skilled labor), exert more of an 
influence on the way institutions evolve than political inequality per se.   
 
              III 
  Comparative study of the record of the long-term development of the societies of the Americas 
supports our hypothesis that there were empirical regularities in the ways strategic institutions evolved, 
such that those that began as colonies with relatively extreme inequality were more restrictive in 
providing access to economic opportunities and less oriented toward investing in public goods and 
infrastructure than were those that began with relative equality or homogeneity among the population.  
This pattern contributed to the long-term persistence of extreme inequality among the former group, and 
may also help to explain why their long-term records of economic growth have been mediocre at best, 
relative to those of the latter and especially relative to expectations during the era of European 
colonization.  The specific mechanisms that worked to produce the divergence in institutional and other 
development are complex and difficult to discern, but it seems clear that they often involved factors 
other than differences in the political power of the elite.  
  It has long been recognized that the conduct of elections, including who holds the right to vote, is 
one of the most crucial of institutions.  Varying the rules or organization of how votes are cast and of      
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who casts them can have a fundamental impact on the policy choices that the elected representatives – 
who in some sense constitute the collective government of the electors – make.  As governments 
generally have a monopoly of power over certain important activities, there are often major implications 
for how a society’s resources or wealth is distributed across the population, as well as for the pace of 
economic growth.  Given what is at stake, it should not be surprising that throughout history many have 
fought and died over both the design of the rules and the outcomes of elections.  Most of the societies of 
the Americas had achieved independence from their colonial masters and were at least nominal 
democracies by the early 19
th century, and thus our estimates (see Table 1) of how broadly the franchise 
was extended over time and of what fractions of respective populations actually voted in elections have 
a direct bearing on the extent to which elites based largely on wealth, human capital, race, and gender 
held disproportionate political power in their respective countries, and on whether and how initial 
differences in such power or influence persisted.  
  The estimates reveal that until the 20
th century it was common in all countries to reserve the right 
to vote to adult males (white adult males until after the Civil War), but the United States and Canada 
were the clear leaders in doing away with restrictions based on wealth and literacy, and much higher 
fractions of the populations voted in these countries than anywhere else in the Americas. Not only did 
the United States and Canada attain the secret ballot and extend the franchise to even the poor and 
illiterate much earlier (restrictions that were reintroduced in the United States at the expense of blacks 
and immigrants late in the 19
th century), but the evolution of the proportion of the population that voted 
was at least a half-century ahead of even the most democratic countries of South America (namely, 
Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica, which have generally been regarded as among the most egalitarian 
of Latin American societies and whose initial factor endowments most closely resembled those of the 
United States and Canada). 
  It is remarkable that as late as 1900, none of the countries in Latin America had the secret ballot      
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or more than a miniscule fraction of the population casting votes.
15 The great majority of European 
nations, as well as the United States and Canada, achieved secrecy in balloting and universal adult male 
suffrage long before other countries in the western hemisphere, and the proportions of the populations 
voting  in  the  former  were  always  higher,  often  four  to  five  times  higher,  than  those  in  the  latter. 
Although many factors may have contributed to the low levels of participation in South America and the 
Caribbean, wealth and literacy requirements were serious binding constraints. Some societies, such as 
Barbados, maintained wealth-based suffrage restrictions until the mid-20th century, while most joined 
the  United  States  and  Canada  in  moving  away  from  economic  requirements  in  the  19th  century. 
However, whereas the states in the United States frequently adopted explicit racial limitations when they 
abandoned economic requirements, Latin American countries typically chose to screen by literacy.  
  The contrast between the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and the Latin American 
countries, on the other, was not so evident at the outset. Despite the sentiments popularly attributed to 
the Founding Fathers, voting in the United States was largely a privilege reserved for white men with 
significant amounts of property until early in the 19th century. By 1815, only four states had adopted 
universal white male suffrage, but as the movement to do away with political inequality gained strength, 
the rest of the country followed suit: virtually all new entrants to the Union extended voting rights to all 
white  men  (with  explicit  racial  restrictions  and  very  favorable  definitions  for  white  immigrants  of 
residence  generally  introduced  in  the  same  state  constitutions  that  did  away  with  economic 
requirements), and older states revised their laws in the wake of protracted political debates.  The rapid 
extension of access to the franchise in the frontier states, which were distinguished both by more equal 
distributions of wealth and labor scarcity, not coincidentally paralleled liberal policies toward public 
                                                 
15 There is some controversy about whether Argentina had wealth and literacy requirements for suffrage. Whatever the case, 
the proportions of the population voting were very low in that country (1.8 percent in 1896) until the electoral reform law of 
1912. Those who point to the absence of such electoral restrictions at the level of the national government suggest that the 
low voter participation was due to a failure of immigrants to change their citizenship and vote, as well as to the lack of a 
secret ballot. Others believe that restrictions on the franchise had, in fact, been enacted and were enforced at the provincial 
level until 1912.  See the discussion in Engerman and Sokoloff 2005.      
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schools and access to land, as well as other policies that were expected to be attractive to potential 
migrants.
16 It is hard to avoid the conclusion that political equality was the result of economic equality, 
rooted in labor scarcity, rather than the reverse.  It is striking that pioneers in extending suffrage, such as 
new states to the United States, Argentina, and Uruguay, did so during periods in which they hoped to 
attract migrants, such that the rights to suffrage formed part of a package of policies thought to be 
potentially attractive to  those contemplating relocation.
17  When  elites—such as land or other  asset 
holders—desire common men to locate in the polity, they thus may choose to extend access to privileges 
and opportunities even in the absence of threats of civil disorder; indeed, a polity (or one set of elites) 
may find itself competing with another to attract the labor or other resources.
18 Alternative explanations, 
such as the importance of national heritage, are not very useful in identifying why Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Costa Rica pulled so far ahead of their Latin American neighbors, or why other British colonies in 
the New World lagged behind Canada.  
  Schooling institutions provide yet another appropriate and important test of whether societies 
that began with extreme inequality exhibited different patterns of investment in public goods and of 
access to economic opportunities.  Increases in a society’s levels of schooling and literacy have been 
related  both  theoretically  and  empirically  to  many  socioeconomic  changes  conducive  to  growth, 
including higher labor productivity, more rapid technological change, and higher rates of commercial 
and political participation.
19 Although many New World societies arising out of European colonization 
were  so  prosperous  that  they  clearly  had  the  material  resources  to  attain  high  rates  of  literacy  by 
establishing a widespread network of primary schools, only a few made such investments on a scale 
sufficient to serve the general population before the 20th century. The exceptional societies, in terms of 
                                                 
16 See the extended treatment of these and related issue in Engeman and Sokoloff 2005. 
17 For the concern with attracting migrants in the U.S. and Argentina for example, see Engerman and Sokoloff 2005; Castro 
1971; Solberg 1970; and Adelman 1994.   
18. See Acemoglu and Robinson 2000 for the argument that in many western European countries, the franchise was extended 
under threat.       
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leadership in investing in institutions of primary education, were the United States and Canada (see 
Table 2). Virtually from the time of settlement, the populations of these countries seem generally to have 
been  convinced  of  the  value  of  providing  their  children  (females  as  well  as  males)  with  a  basic 
education, including the ability to read and write. It was common for schools to be organized and funded 
at the village or town level, especially in New England. The United States probably had the most literate 
population in the world by the beginning of the 19th century, but the common school movement, which 
got under way in the 1820s (following closely after the movement to extend the franchise), put the 
country on an accelerated path of investment in educational institutions. Between 1825 and 1850, nearly 
every  northern  state  that  had  not  already  done  so  enacted  a  law  strongly  encouraging  or  requiring 
localities to establish free schools open to all children and supported by general taxes.
20  Schools were 
also widespread in early 19th century Canada, and although this northern-most English colony lagged 
behind  the  U.S.  by  several  decades  in  establishing  tax-supported  schools  with  universal  access,  its 
literacy rates were nearly as high.
21 
  The rest of the hemisphere trailed far behind the United States and Canada in primary schooling 
and in literacy. Despite enormous wealth, the other societies of British colonial origin were very slow to 
organize schooling institutions that would serve broad segments of the population.
22 Similarly, even the 
most progressive Latin American countries, such as Argentina and Uruguay, were more than seventy-
five years behind the United States and Canada in this regard. These societies began to boost their 
investments in public schooling at roughly the same time that they intensified their efforts to attract 
migrants from Europe, well before they implemented a general liberalization of the franchise. While this 
association might be interpreted as providing for the socialization of foreign immigrants, it also suggests 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
19. See the discussion in Easterlin 1981. 
20. Cubberley 1920. 
21. See, for example, Phillips 1957; and Wilson, Stamp, and Audet 1970. 
22. Indeed, significant steps were not taken in this direction until the British Colonial Office began promoting schooling in 
the 1870s.The increased concern for promoting education in the colonies may have been related to developments in Great 
Britain itself. Several important expansions of the public provision of elementary education occurred during the 1870s,      
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that the elites may have been inclined to extend access to opportunities as part of an effort to attract the 
scarce labor for which they were directly or indirectly competing. The latter perspective is supported by 
the  observation  that  major  investments  in  primary  schooling  did  not  generally  occur  in  any  Latin 
American country until the national governments provided the funds; in contrast to the pattern in North 
America,  local  and  state  governments  in  Latin  America  were  not  willing  or  able  to  take  on  this 
responsibility on their own. Most of these societies did not achieve high levels of literacy until well into 
the  20th  century.  Fairly  generous  support  was  made  available,  however,  for  universities  and  other 
institutions of higher learning that were more geared toward children of the elite.  
  Two mechanisms help explain why extreme levels of inequality depressed investments in 
schooling. First, in settings where private schooling predominated or where parents paid user fees for 
their children, greater wealth or income inequality would generally reduce the fraction of the school-age 
population enrolled, holding per capita income constant. Second, greater inequality likely exacerbated 
the collective-action problems associated with the establishment and funding of universal public 
schools, either because the distribution of benefits across the population was quite different from the 
incidence of taxes and other costs or simply because population heterogeneity made it more difficult for 
communities to reach consensus on public projects. Where the wealthy enjoyed disproportionate 
political power, they were able to procure schooling services for their own children and to resist being 
taxed to underwrite or subsidize services to others. 
Indeed, this sort of interpretation is supported by examination of the structures of public finance 
employed across the Americas over time.  At the national government level, taxes on international trade 
were the principal source of tax revenue throughout the hemisphere after the wave of independence 
movements of the late-18
th and early 19
th centuries.  In the United States, a 1789 law establishing the 
tariff was one of the first laws enacted by the federal government.  Although the federal government had 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
including the 1870 Education Act and the 1876 passage of a law calling for compulsory schooling through the age of ten.       
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other sources of revenues, customs duties provided by far the dominant share of national government 
revenue up through the Civil War.  In rough terms, these revenues amounted to 1 to 2 percent of GNP 
(except for spurts during wartime), and were primarily (over 80 percent) directed to defense, interest on 
debt, general government expenses, and other miscellaneous expenditures.   The patterns were roughly 
the same in Latin America.  In Mexico, for example, port taxes, income from the tobacco monopoly, and 
excise taxes yielded 75 to 85 percent of national government revenue over the latter half of the 19
th 
century.    In  Colombia,  customs  duties  and  income  from  state  monopolies  on  commodities  such  as 
tobacco and salt brought in nearly 80 percent of national revenues by the 1840s.   Overall, although wars 
and other threats to the social order (such as the War of 1812, the U.S. Civil War, the war between 
Mexico and the U.S., and various internal uprisings) sometimes stimulated the imposition of direct taxes 
that extended the reach of national governments in progressive directions (the income tax in the US 
during the Civil War, and the property tax in Mexico that was introduced because of the war between 
that country and the U.S.), the general pattern throughout the hemisphere well into the 20
th century was 
reliance by national governments on tax structures that targeted commodities or trade rather than income 
or wealth.
23   
Stark differences existed across the societies of the Americas, however, in the size and revenue 
sources of state/provincial and local  governments.   Local  governments  were much smaller in  Latin 
American nations than in the United States and Canada (see Table 3).  They accounted for only about 10 
percent of total government revenue in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico throughout the 19
th century (and 
in Chile, between 10 and 20 percent during the second decade of the 20
th century, despite the absence of 
state/provincial  governments).      The  contrast  with  the  neighboring  societies  in  North  America  is 
dramatic.  In  both  the  U.S.  and  Canada,  the  local  governments  collected  more  than  half  of  overall 
                                                 
23  The  income  tax  introduced  during  the  Civil  War  was  ultimately  ruled  unconstitutional,  and  thus  it  was  not  until  a 
constitutional amendment that such a tax could be reinstituted.      
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government revenue from the middle of the 19
th century onward.  Even as late as the 1930s, the share of 
local government revenue was nearly 40 percent in both the US and Canada.  
This  predisposition  of  the  North  American  populations  to  organize  and  support  local 
governments was evident as early as the 17
th century, despite the absence during that era of distinctively 
(as compared to other societies in the Americas) high per capita incomes.   It is not entirely clear how 
substantial local governments were at the establishment of the United States, but local governments 
certainly  grew  very  rapidly  during  the  early  decades  of  the  19
th  century  as  the  common  school 
movement progressed, and as local governments were increasingly engaged in helping to organize new 
investments in roads and other infrastructure required as the economy was beginning to industrialize.  
What is apparent is that, with a few brief exceptions during and after major wars, local governments 
were  the  largest  component  of  the  overall  government  sector  throughout  the  19
th  century.    This  is 
especially  striking  in  that  the  aggregate  pattern  of  expenditures  by  local  governments  was  quite 
progressive in that the main priorities of local governments were (well into the 19th century) schools, 
roads, and other infrastructure that generate broadly distributed social returns.
24  Moreover, their heavy 
reliance on the property tax, together with their large share of the government sector, made for a rather 
progressive tax structure at both the local and national (all levels of government together) levels.
25  This 
pattern, characterized by the predominance of property and inheritance taxes accounting for the bulk of 
the revenue collected by governments at all levels, endured into the early decades of the 20
th century (a 
similar pattern holds in Canada).
26   In contrast, although the local governments in Latin America raised 
                                                 
24 At 1900, local governments seem to have obtained well over 90 percent of revenue from property taxes.  For further 
discussion of how the importance of the property tax as a source of state revenue varied over the 19th century, see Wallis 
2001.  
25 Any conclusions about just how progressive or regressive any particular tax structures are must, of course, take into 
account  the  ultimate  incidence  of  the  taxes  assessed.    An  analysis  of  incidence  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper.  
Nevertheless, we feel rather confident, especially for the 19
th century, of following the convention of presuming that property 
taxes are more progressive in incidence than levies consisting of tariffs on imported goods and the revenues obtained from 
state monopolies on consumer commodities such as liquors and tobacco.  
26 At 1902, property, death, and gift taxes accounted for more than 60 percent of total tax revenue to all levels of government 
in the U.S. combined.  See Table 7.1 in Sokoloff and Zolt 2004.        
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relatively more of their revenue from taxes on property and income than did the respective national or 
state/provincial governments, they relied much less on these sources than did their North American 
counterparts.  This, together with the markedly smaller size of local governments in Latin American 
nations resulted in radically different, and much less progressive, aggregate tax structures overall than in 
the U.S. or Canada.   
   Although there may be other explanations for these patterns in the evolution of tax institutions, 
the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that initial differences in the extent of inequality across 
these societies contributed to the different decisions they made regarding how much revenue to raise, the 
relative use of different tax instruments, the nature and size of state and local governments, and the types 
and size of government expenditure programs. In general, the countries that began with more inequality 
developed structures of public finance that relied relatively more on indirect taxes and placed less of a 
tax burden on those with higher levels of wealth.  This alone should have encouraged the persistence of 
extreme inequality, but the stunted local governments, which are the same authorities most concerned 
with public schooling, transportation, water/sewer projects, and other types of investment projects that 
generate  benefits  for  a  broad  spectrum  of  the  population,  also  worked  in  the  same  direction.    An 
explanation for this pattern is readily available.  With a radically unequal distribution of resources, elites 
would bear most of any tax burden, especially one levied on wealth or income, and realize a smaller than 
proportionate benefit, especially since they could procure for themselves and their families many of the 
same services privately.  It was only in the 20
th century, when returns to schooling grew, when suffrage 
came to be extended, and when import-substitution policies sharply reduced the revenues that could be 
captured from imports, that the structures of public finance in Latin America began to change in more 
progressive directions.     
  Land policy comprises a final example of the ways in which institutions may have contributed to 
the persistence of inequality over the long run. Virtually all the economies in the Americas had ample      
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supplies of public lands well into the 19
th century and beyond. Since the respective governments of each 
colony, province, or nation were regarded as the owners of this resource, they were able to influence the 
distribution  of  wealth,  as  well  as  the  pace  of  settlement  for  effective  production,  by  implementing 
policies to control the availability of land, set prices, establish minimum or maximum acreages, provide 
credit  for  such  purposes,  and  design  tax  systems.  Because  agriculture  was  the  dominant  sector 
throughout the Americas, questions of how best to employ this public resource for the national interest, 
and how to make the land available for private use, were widely recognized as highly important and 
often became the subject of protracted political debates and struggles. Land policy was also used as a 
policy instrument to influence the labor force, either by encouraging immigration through making land 
readily available or by influencing the regional distribution of labor (or supply of wage labor) through 
limiting access and raising land prices.  
  The  United  States  never  experienced  major  obstacles  in  this  regard,  and  the  terms  of  land 
acquisition became easier over the course of the 19th century.
27 The well-known Homestead Act of 
1862, which essentially made land free in plots suitable for family farms to all those who settled and 
worked the land for a specified period, was perhaps the culmination of this policy of promoting broad 
access to land. Canada pursued similar policies: the Dominion Lands Act of 1872 closely resembled the 
Homestead  Act  in  both  spirit  and  substance.  Argentina  and  Brazil  instituted  similar  changes  in  the 
second half of the 19th century as a means to encourage immigration, but these efforts were much less 
directed and thus less successful at getting land to smallholders than the programs in the United States 
and Canada.
28 In Argentina, for example, a number of factors explain the contrast in outcomes. First, the 
elites of Buenos Aires, whose interests favored keeping scarce labor in the province if not the capital 
city, were much more effective at weakening or blocking programs than were their urban counterparts in 
                                                 
27. See Gates 1968 for a comprehensive overview of U.S. land policy. Discussions of Canadian land policy include Solberg 
1987; Pomfret 1981, pp. 111–19; and Adelman 1994, chap. 2. 
28. See Viotti da Costa 1985, chap. 4; Solberg 1987; Solberg’s essay in Platt and di Tella 1985; and the excellent discussions      
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North America. Second, even those policies nominally intended to broaden access tended to involve 
large grants to land developers (with the logic that allocative efficiency could best be achieved through 
exchanges between private agents) or transfers to occupants who were already using the land (including 
those who were grazing livestock). They thus generally conveyed public lands to private owners in 
much larger and concentrated holdings than did the policies in the United States and Canada. Third, the 
processes by which large landholdings might have broken up in the absence of scale economies may 
have operated very slowly in Argentina: once the land was in private hands, the potential value of land 
in raising or harvesting livestock may have set too high a floor on land prices for immigrants and other 
ordinary would-be farmers to manage.  Such constraints were exacerbated by the underdevelopment of 
mortgage and financial institutions more generally.
29 
  Argentina,  Canada,  and  the  United  States  all  had  an  extraordinary  abundance  of  virtually 
uninhabited public lands to transfer to private hands in the interest of bringing this public resource into 
production and serving other general interests. In societies such as Mexico, however, the issues at stake 
in land policy were very different. Good land was relatively scarce, and labor was relatively abundant. 
Here the lands in question had long been controlled by Native Americans, but without individual private 
property rights. Mexico was not unique in pursuing policies, especially near the end of the 19th and the 
first decade of the 20th centuries, that had the effect of conferring ownership of much of this land to 
large non-Native American landholders.
30 The 1856 Ley Lerdo and the 1857 Constitution had set down 
methods of privatizing these public lands in a manner that could originally have been intended to help 
Native American farmers enter a national land market and commercial economy. Under the regime of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
in Adelman 1994.  
29. It is generally thought that the introduction of livestock to Argentina, when the Spanish first arrived in the 16
th century, 
was the basis for widespread herds of feral cattle that were present during the 19
th century and could virtually be harvested.  
Such production of animal products (hides and beef) was associated with scale economies and did not require much in the 
way of labor.  These conditions may have increased the economic viability of large estates where labor was scarce and land 
abundant.  In contrast, because the major crops produced in the expansion of the northern United States and Canada were 
grains, whose production was relatively labor intensive and characterized by quite limited scale economies, the policy of  
encouraging smallholding was effective. See Adelman 1994 and Engerman and Sokoloff 2002 for more discussion.         
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Porfirio  Díaz,  however,  these  laws  became  the  basis  for  a  series  of  new  statutes  and  policies  that 
effected a massive transfer of such lands (over 10.7 percent of the national territory) between 1878 and 
1908 to large holders such as survey and land development companies, either in the form of outright 
grants for services rendered by the companies or for prices set by decree.  
  In Table 4, we present estimates for these four countries of the fractions of household heads, or a 
near equivalent, that owned land in agricultural areas in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  The 
figures indicate enormous differences across the countries in the prevalence of land ownership among 
the adult male population in rural areas. On the eve of the Mexican Revolution, the figures from the 
1910 census suggest that only 2.4 percent of household heads in rural Mexico owned land. The number 
is astoundingly low. The dramatic land policy measures in Mexico at the end of the 19th century may 
have succeeded in privatizing most of the public lands, but they left the vast majority of the rural 
population without any land at all. The evidence obviously conforms well with the idea that in societies 
that began with extreme inequality, such as Mexico, institutions evolved so as to greatly advantage the 
elite in access to economic opportunities, and they thus contributed to the persistence of that extreme 
inequality.  
  In contrast, the proportion of adult males that owned land in rural areas was quite high in the 
United  States,  at  just  below  75  percent  in  1900.  Although  the  prevalence  of  land  ownership  was 
markedly lower in the South, where blacks were disproportionately concentrated, the overall picture is 
one of a series of liberal land policies, leading up to the Homestead Act of 1862, providing broad access 
to this fundamental type of economic opportunity. Canada had an even better record, with nearly 90 
percent  of  household  heads  owning  the  agricultural  lands  they  occupied  in  1901.  The  estimates  of 
landholding in these two countries support the notion that land policies made a difference, especially 
when compared to Argentina. The rural regions of Argentina constitute a set of frontier provinces, where 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
30. For further discussion of Mexico, see McBride 1923; Tannebaum 1929; and Holden 1994.      
       
   
22 
 
one would expect higher rates of ownership than in Buenos Aires. The numbers, however, suggest a 
much lower prevalence of land ownership than in the two North American economies.
31 Nevertheless, 
all of these countries were far more effective than Mexico in making land ownership available to the 
general population. The contrast between the United States and Canada, with their practices of offering 
easy  access  to  small  units  of  land,  and  the  rest  of  the  Americas  (as  well  as  the  contrast  between 
Argentina and Mexico) is consistent with the hypothesis that the initial extent of inequality influenced 
the  way  in  which  institutions  evolved  and  in  so  doing  helped  foster  persistence  in  the  degree  of 
inequality over time. 
 
              IV   
  There has long been debate over the impact of the European establishment of colonies around the 
world  that  took  place  over  centuries,  beginning  in  the  1400s.    Much  of  the  controversy  has  been 
concerned with issues such as how the long-term performance of the colonized areas and the colonizing 
economies  were  affected  by  the  exchange  of  resources  and  terms  of  trade  between  them  and  the 
imbalance  of  military  power.      As  we  have  argued  here,  however,  one  of  the  most  fundamental 
consequences of European colonization may have been in altering the composition of the populations in 
the societies colonized.  Because the efforts of the Europeans generally meant implanting communities 
who were greatly advantaged over natives in terms of human capital and legal status, and because the 
trajectories of institutional development were sensitive to the incidence of extreme inequality that often 
followed, their activity had long lingering effects.   Although more study is needed to identify all of the 
mechanisms at work, it seems clear that colonies in the Americas with extreme inequality, as compared 
to those with relative equality, were systematically more likely to  evolve institutions that restricted 
                                                 
31. Our work with the data from the 1914 census yields the same qualitative results.  It is worth noting that the proportions of 
families that owned land are exaggerated by the 1895 census figures. A close examination of the manuscripts indicates that 
double counting, in which both the husband and wife were listed as landowners, was prevalent in many parts of Argentina.       
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access to economic opportunities and to generate lower rates of public investment in schools and other 
infrastructure considered conducive to growth.  These patterns of institutional development, which tend 
to yield persistence over time, may help to explain why a great many former European colonies that 
began with extreme inequality have suffered poor economic outcomes.               
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LAWS GOVERNING THE FRANCHISE AND THE EXTENT OF VOTING IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES, 1840-1940 
 






    In Balloting      Population 
Voting 
           
  1840-80         
          -- 
Chile  1869  N  Y  Y  1.6% 
  1878  N  N  N
32  -- 
Costa Rica  1890  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Ecuador  1848  Y  Y  Y  0.0 
  1856  Y  Y  Y  0.1 
Mexico  1840  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Peru  1875  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Uruguay  1840  Y  Y  Y  -- 
  1880  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Venezuela  1840  Y  Y  Y  -- 
  1880  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Canada  1867  Y  Y  N  7.7 
  1878  N  Y  N  12.9 
           
United States     1850
33  N  N  N  12.9 
  1880  N  N  N  18.3 
           
                                                 
32 After eliminating wealth and education requirements in 1878, Chile instituted a literacy requirement in 1885, which seems to have been responsible for a 
sharp decline in the proportion of the population who were registered to vote. 
33 Three states, Connecticut, Louisiana, and New Jersey, still maintained wealth requirements at 1840, but eliminated them soon afterwards. All states 
except for Illinois and Virginia had implemented the secret ballot by the end of the 1840s.      
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  1881-1920         
Argentina  1896  Y  Y  Y  1.8%
34 
  1916  N  N  N  9.0 
Brazil  1894  Y  Y  Y  2.2 
  1914  Y  Y  Y  2.4 
Chile  1881  N  N  N  3.1 
  1920  N  N  Y  4.4 
Colombia    1918
35  N  N  N  6.9 
Costa Rica  1912  Y  Y  Y  -- 
  1919  Y  N  N  10.6 
Ecuador  1888  N  Y  Y  2.8 
  1894  N  N  Y  3.3 
Mexico  1920  N  N  N  8.6 
Peru  1920  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Uruguay  1900  Y  Y  Y  -- 
  1920  N  N  N  13.8 
Venezuela  1920  Y  Y  Y  -- 
Canada  1911  N  N  N  18.1 
  1917  N  N  N  20.5 
United States  1900  N  N  Y
36  18.4 
  1920  N  N  Y  25.1 
           
           
           
           
           
                                                 
34 This figure is for the city of Buenos Aires, and likely overstates the proportion who voted at the national level. 
35 The information on restrictions refers to national laws. The 1863 Constitution empowered provincial state governments to regulate electoral affairs. 
Afterwards, elections became restricted (in terms of the franchise for adult males) and indirect in some states.  It was not until 1948 that a national law 
established universal adult male suffrage throughout the country.  This pattern was followed in other Latin American countries, as it was in the U.S. and 
Canada to a lesser extent. 
36 Eighteen states, 7 southern and 11 non-southern, introduced literacy requirements between 1890 and 1926.  These restrictions were directed primarily at 
Blacks and immigrants.      
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  1921-40         
Argentina  1928  N  N  N  12.8% 
  1937  N  N  N  15.0 
Bolivia  1951  ?  Y  Y  4.1 
Brazil  1930  Y  Y  Y  5.7 
Colombia  1930  N  N  N  11.1 
  1936  N  N  N  5.9 
Chile  1920  N  N  Y  4.4 
  1931  N  N  Y  6.5 
  1938  N  N  Y  9.4 
Costa Rica  1940  N  N  N  17.6 
Ecuador  1940  N  N  Y  3.3 
Mexico  1940  N  N  N  11.8 
Peru  1940  N  N  Y  -- 
Uruguay  1940  N  N  N  19.7 
Venezuela  1940  N  Y  Y  -- 
Canada  1940  N  N  N  41.1 
United States  1940  N  N  Y  37.8 
 
Notes and Sources:  Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 2000. 
 
      
       




LITERACY RATES IN THE AMERICAS, 1850-1950 
  Year  Ages  Rate 
       
Argentina  1869  +6  23.8% 
  1895  +6  45.6 
  1900  +10  52.0 
  1925  +10  73.0 
       
Bolivia  1900  +10  17.0 
       
Brazil  1872  +7  15.8 
  1890  +7  14.8 
  1900  +7  25.6 
  1920  +10  30.0 
       
British Honduras  1911  +10  59.6 
(Belize)  1931  +10  71.8 
       
Chile  1865  +7  18.0 
  1875  +7  25.7 
  1885  +7  30.3 
  1900  +10  43.0 
  1925  +10  66.0 
       
Colombia  1918  +15  32.0 
       
Costa Rica  1892  +7  23.6 
  1900  +10  33.0 
  1925  +10  64.0 
       
Cuba  1861  +7  23.8 
(38.5,5.3)* 
  1899  +10  40.5 
  1925  +10  67.0      
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Guatemala  1893  +7  11.3 
  1925  +10  15.0 
       
Honduras  1887  +7  15.2 
  1925  +10  29.0 
       
Jamaica  1871  +5  16.3 
  1891  +5  32.0 
  1911  +5  47.2 
       
Mexico  1900  +10  22.2 
  1925  +10  36.0 
       
Paraguay  1886  +7  19.3 
  1900  +10  30.0 
       
Peru  1925  +10  38.0 
       
Uruguay  1900  +10  54.0 
  1925  +10  70.0 
       
Venezuela  1925  +10  34.0 
       
Canada  1861  All  82.5 
Eng-majority counties  1861  All  93.0 
Fr- majority counties  1861  All  81.2 
       
United States       
North Whites  1850  +10  96.9 
South Whites  1850  +10  91.5 
All  1870  +10  80.0 
(88.5,21.1)* 
  1890  +10  86.7 
(92.3,43.2)* 
  1910  +10  92.3      
       





*The figures for Whites and Non-Whites are reported respectively within parentheses. 
 
 
Sources: Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff 2000.      
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TABLE 3  
DISTRIBUTION OF TAX REVENUES ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT DURING 
THE 19th AND 20th CENTURIES: BRAZIL, CHILE COLOMBIA, MEXICO, CANADA, 









or other Local 
(%) 
Brazil       
1826  30.8  69.2  0 
1856  79.5  17.1  3.3 
1860  78.2  18.2  3.5 
1885/86  76.3  18.5  5.2 
Chile       
1913  85.8  --  14.2 
1915  82.7  --  17.3 
1920  85.3  --  14.7 
Colombia       
1839  88.4  2.9  8.7 
1842  91.8  1.6  6.7 
1850  85.4  8.7  5.8 
1870  46.6  30.8  22.6 
1894  60  32  8 
1898  66.7  28.6  4.8 
Mexico       
1882  69.1  19.5  11.5 
1890  74.7  16.3  9 
1900  67.3  19.8  12.9 
1908  70.6  17.1  12.3 
Canada       
1933  42.5  17.9  39.6 
1950  68.7  18.7  12.6 
1960  62.8  20.7  16.4 
United States       
1855  25.5  17.4  57.1 
1875  39.6  16.4  44.0 
1895  36  14  50 
1913  29.1  13.2  57.6 
1927  35.5  18  46.5 
1950  68.3  17.3  14.4 
 
Sources and Notes: Sokoloff and Zolt 2004.       
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TABLE 4  
LANDHOLDING IN RURAL REGIONS OF MEXICO, THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND 
ARGENTINA DURING THE EARLY 1900s 
Country, year, and region  Proportion of household heads who own 
land
a 
Mexico, 1910   
North Pacific  5.6 
North  3.4 
Central  2.0 
Gulf  2.1 
South Pacific  1.5 
Total rural Mexico  2.4 
   
United States, 1900   
North Atlantic  79.2 
South Atlantic  55.8 
North Central  72.1 
South Central  51.4 
Western  83.4 
Alaska/Hawaii  42.1 
Total United States  74.5 
   
Canada, 1901   
British Columbia  87.1 
Alberta  95.8 
Saskatchewan  96.2 
Manitoba  88.9 
Ontario  80.2 
Quebec  90.1 
Maritime
b  95.0 
Total Canada  87.1 
   
Argentina, 1895   
Chaco  27.8 
Formosa  18.5 
Missiones  26.7 
La Pampa  9.7 
Neuquén  12.3 
Río Negro  15.4 
Chubut  35.2 
Santa Cruz  20.2 
Tierra del Fuego   6.6 
Notes and Sources:  Engerman and  Sokoloff 2002. 
a.  Landownership is defined as follows: in Mexico, household heads who own land; in the US, farms that are owner operated; in Canada, total 
occupiers of farm lands who are owners; and in Argentina, the ratio of landowners to the number of males between the ages of 18 and 50.  
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